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 This paper analyses trade policies in the 
European Union. The common commercial 
policy is based on equal principles, 
particularly for changes in tariff rates, the 
conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, 
equal measures of liberalization, export 
policy and measures to protect trade with 
those to be taken in case of dumping or 
subsidies (anti-dumping and anti-subsidy). 
Is the common external trade policy, very 
free-trade and characterized by a minimal 
regulatory framework, suitable for the 
competitiveness and relocation governing 
the European Union today because of 
globalization that leads businesses to 
invest in areas with low labour costs and 
social protection? What leeway do 
national states have to introduce 
distortions in trade or the emergence of 
new business areas? Can Clusters be 
analysed like an alternative to traditional 
protectionism? Can strategic sectors be 
protected? 
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Introduction 
During the inter-war period a globalization crisis ap-
peared. The traumatism associated with the trade closing
of the 1930s led to ask for (in a more or less conscious
way) protection versus free trade debate in terms of bi-
nary choice. In Western countries, the tightening of trade
policy is made in order to resurface the spectre of a drop-
sufficient and is the subject of a conviction of principle.
The terms associated with the word protectionism often
have a negative connotation: temptation, spectrum, trap,
risk, war....  
In our opinion it was forgotten that in reality protectionism
is a gradual concept. Free trade is an extreme case, that
of a zero degree of protection. At the other extreme there
is  the absolute autocracy if the authorities manage to
avoid smuggling. Historically and in recent years, protec-
tion is the rule and free trade the exception, on the other
hand in economic theory, the reverse is true, free trade is
the rule and protection the exception. Debate protection
versus free trade should replace questions about the de-
termination of the trade policy relevant for a country or an
economic union. A good policy depends heavily on the
structures of the national economy, its main field of ac-
tivity, its forward or its relative backwardness in terms of
development. 
The British example in the nineteenth century shows that
free trade is a policy relevant to a commercial economy,
relatively early and beneficial with the fields of business.
The abolition of the Corn Laws in May 1846 as part of a
broad package of trade liberalization (elimination of acts of
navigation in 1849, repeal of many tariffs between 1846
and 1852) is generally a success1. But in the nineteenth
century the examples of the United States, Germany and
Japan show the benefit of active trade policies to protect
infant industries in relatively large national markets,
especially when facing British competition, a country that 
                                                 
1 
 The tariff allows the UK to open foreign markets to expand. The major 
European powers agree indeed steps to relax their policy like France, 
which since the early 1850s lowered the average level of tariffs. As 
expected, the British technical advance allows it to improve its 
positions. The growth of exports was already fast in the 10 to 15 years 
earlier (around 5% per annum) and the trend accelerated after 1846. 
From 1843-47 to 1857-61, the volume of British exports increased by 
just over 6% per annum. Growth is also exceptionally dynamic over the 
same period; the annual growth rate in volume of GDP is 2.4%. 
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then had absolute advantages in many manufacturing 
industries. In global terms, recent work by O’Rourke 
(2000), Jacks (2006) show a positive correlation 
between import tariffs and economic growth across 
countries from 1875 to 1914.  
In our opinion, the economic history suggests that good 
p o l i c y  m u s t  b e  a c t i v e  e n o u gh to maintain internal 
cohesion, a balance between the social forces that 
control the speed of opening up trade, fostering the 
emergence of new business areas, but also good enough 
to preserve an international opening vector of a gain in 
terms of welfare on a global scale.  
Since the Second World War, the taboo has long led 
protectionist national authorities not to question the 
definition of a trade policy capable of promoting a 
pragmatic national interest and not be among the losers 
of globalization (the case of an economy which, for 
example, specializes in one or more productions while 
the terms of trade are deteriorating).  
In Europe and especially in France since the late 1990s, 
the controversies around the relocation of industrial 
enterprises and the awareness of the technical 
unification of global economy acutely posed the problem 
of competitiveness of the economies of the most 
advanced countries. While the international transmission 
of innovation is accelerating, the delay of wage growth on 
the growth of productivity in emerging countries seems to 
confer a competitive advantage in most manufacturing 
sectors. The phenomenon is accentuated by the 
retention by the emerging economies of a real under-
valuation of their currency like the Chinese yuan.  
In the 2000s, some activism of trade policy has been 
observed. In France, rather than recognizing the reality of 
a commercial activism that may well come under the 
definition of a protectionist policy, the implementation of 
economic patriotism was mentioned in the wake of 
Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin. The West is facing 
a new challenge: how to bring benefits in terms of 
absolute cost of production in this environment of fierce 
competition from emerging countries?  
In Europe, more precisely in the European Union, 
relations, particularly trade with the outside world is the 
common external trade policy. Upon the signing of the 
Treaty of Rome, the EU has stated its willingness to 
contribute to the removal of restrictions on international 
trade and development of world trade. Member States 
have vested exclusive jurisdiction to the Commission, 
which negotiates all trade agreements with third 
countries (export promotion - except agricultural refunds 
remaining with the Member States). The common 
commercial policy is based on equal principles, 
particularly for changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of 
tariff and trade agreements, equal measures of 
liberalization, export policy and measures to protect 
trade with those to be taken in case of dumping or 
subsidies (anti-dumping and anti-subsidy). It should be 
remembered that duties fuel the EU budget. The Council 
of the European Union has complemented this by 
adopting in December 1994 a Regulation on trade 
barriers (ROC) which is a legal instrument giving the right 
to businesses and industries or their associations as well 
as Member States to act in order to open third country 
markets by eliminating trade barriers in the interest of 
EU exports. The ROC's mission is to ensure the effective 
application of rights conferred upon the Union by 
international trade agreements when countries adopt or 
maintain trade barriers2. The ROC is different from other 
trade protection instruments such as anti-dumping or 
countervailing measures, which require that the 
complainant represents a major proportion of the 
Community industry. Indeed, it is the only instrument of 
trade protection which allows a single company to file a 
complaint with the European Commission. With regard to 
trade barriers that affect the European Union market, a 
complaint may be filed by an industry of the Union or by 
a professional association recognized / accredited acting 
on its behalf, who has suffered injury caused by 
obstacles to trade that have an effect on the market. The 
rule is that this facility should be restricted to producers 
who represent a major proportion of the total Community 
production of goods or services identical, similar or 
directly competitive and are affected by the obstacle to 
trade.  
In applying these principles, the Council of Ministers 
shall act by qualified majority (unanimity required for 
agreements related to services and intellectual property 
rights).  
The European Union wants to keep specificity with a 
common e xt ernal tariff (which supplies the EU budget) 
and a common commercial policy. However, the GATT 
and the WTO and the mosaic of European preferential 
agreements with third countries have lowered the level of 
tariff protection community, resulting in increased 
vulnerability to fluctuations in exchange rates of 
countries. Moreover, at the time of the signing of the 
Treaty of Rome, the economy and foreign trade of the 
Community were primarily based on production and 
trade in industrial products. Today, the service sector is 
the main source of employment within the European 
Union and a substantial part of its international trade. 
This was due to the strong competition from emerging 
Asian and Latin American countries in traditional sectors 
and the economic changes brought about by new 
information technologies and communication. Services 
now represent 70% of employment and added value in 
developed countries and a fifth of world trade3. It is 
therefore an area known to play a major role in future 
international trade. Is the the common external trade 
                                                 
2 For example, a third country introduced a barrier to trade which has 
adverse effects on exports from EU Member States or third countries 
introduced a barrier to trade which has adverse effects on the EU 
market . This applies, for example, when a trade barrier is preventing 
the EU to get a basic product that it needs. 
3 The contribution of services to international trade is constant over the 
long period of around 20%, the development of the service sector is 
therefore structurally coefficients of economic openness (exports to 
GDP) down (see Asselain and Blancheton, 2005).  
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policy, very free-trade and characterized by a minimal 
regulatory framework, suitable for the competitiveness 
and relocation governing the European Union today 
because of globalization that leads entrepreneurs to 
invest in areas with low labour costs and social 
protection? What leeway do national states have to 
introduce distortions in trade or the emergence of new 
business areas?  
1. Globalization constraints  
for the European Union  
The main lessons of international trade theory are based 
on a hypothesis now contradicted by the facts: the 
international immobility of factors of production. As a 
result, national states, sheltered behind tariff barriers 
and non-tariff, no longer represent the framework for 
production and trade of developed countries. One 
consequence is that the Ricardian model of comparative 
costs is largely inadequate to account for international 
specialization. The terms of trade between the nations 
have evolved considerably and contribute to the 
polarization of activities and employment in the lowest 
areas on a fiscal, social or environmental level. Two 
arguments deserve to be further discussed today:  
•  The relevance of Ricardian comparative costs as 
founders of international specialization and the 
superiority of free trade on any organized exchange;  
•  Scope of the argument of the continuing rise in the 
range or uninterrupted access to higher value 
added for the production apparatus competition 
from developed countries, particularly those which 
may incorporate intensive research and 
development. An international exchange hierarchy 
would be in place with a specialization in which 
developed and developing countries Winners will be 
developing international exchange.  
The differentiation of products continues to lead to a 
theoretically infinite trade capacity development. The 
development of intra - industry characterizes such a 
situation, and indeed there is progress in international 
trade. Each of the two arguments must be considered.  
1.1. Comparative advantage versus absolute 
advantage in international specialization today 
While we are not yet in a completely de-
compartmentalized world economy, but the trend is 
towards increased trade liberalization in two ways:  
•  The progress of multilateral negotiations under the 
GATT and now the WTO;  
•  Progress of regionalism with the creation of free 
trade areas or customs unions.  
These are two complementary accesses to free trade; 
free trade is the generalized solution in the neo-classical 
analysis which sets the gains in welfare for the highest 
trading nations. Participation "suitable" in international 
exchange relies on specialization according to 
comparative advantages in the institutional framework of 
completely open exchanges. This approach has been 
compromised by the American economist P. Samuelson 
(Samuelson, 2004). The reasoning is conducted within 
the framework of a model with two goods and two factors 
(according to the analysis of J. S. Mill) and taking the 
case of China and the United States with complete 
specialization in one of two properties for each country. If 
China has a productivity gain in the well of expertise from 
the United States until the equalization of the ratio of 
costs between the two countries, while trade has more 
interest in the United States appear losers in the 
international exchange. How is such a gain in productivity 
possible for China? Simply because the international 
diffusion of innovation and research - is developing 
rapidly and is made possible by absorption of a 
workforce increasingly educated, skilled and mobile 
across the world. Even if you can believe that research 
and development progresses mainly in the more 
developed countries in the years ahead, catching up at 
work and reducing the gaps between nations. However, 
new processes, inventions and innovations will appear 
further on short-term mainly from the United States, 
Japan and the European Union and will be increasingly 
used in countries with lower social costs of production. 
The temptation of protection may then be stronger in 
developed countries. Economists such as J. Bhagwati 
(Bhagwati, 2003) stigmatize the protectionist temptation 
emphasizing the reciprocal gain in the exchange that 
would result from cheaper supplies from countries with 
low labour costs, thereby facilitating the productive 
processes of the developed countries incorporating 
these inputs. This movement would be accompanied by 
an increase in product range of more advanced 
countries, thereby perpetuating a model of international 
cooperation where the countries’ leaders have always a 
time of technological advance on the followers. This 
pattern of economic development seems a little too 
mechanical and does not and probably will check in any 
case, it can not meet the needs of socially necessary 
jobs in developed countries. This is especially true for the 
relocation of companies, remaining micro - economically, 
contributing to desertification in industrial developed 
countries (industries and businesses upstream and 
downstream suffer the negative effects). These are 
industries belonging to the Fordist mode of production 
which are mainly involved in this process of relocation to 
Asia (non-tradable goods, the new activities related to 
h e a l t h  o r  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t ,  e v e n  b e y o n d  I T  t o  s o m e  
extent).  
1.2. The stalemate in the final up-market  
and product differentiation  
J. Bhagwati suggests that in developed countries labour 
is relatively more costly and there is an increase in range 
to keep the gain to trade (Bhagwati, 2003). But is this 
far? What can be said about this increase in range being 
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a continuous motion? The mechanical scheme of a rise 
in permanent range of production in developed 
countries, while the lower-end products would be 
relocated in countries lagging behind, the social cost of 
lower production and with a workforce relatively less 
skilled than that of advanced countries, is a model 
whose relevance can only be of a short period (this short 
p e r i o d  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  o n e  w e  c u r r e n t l y  l i v e  i n ) .  
This assumes that there is definitely a technological 
advance of today's countries more advanced on others. 
Moreover, trade based on product differentiation could 
rise less sharply because of the speed of technology 
transfer, contributing to the similarity of product lines 
and strategies of firms in a position of monopolistic or 
oligopolistic market. Ultimately, these products become 
differentiated substitutable products because of the 
narrowness of differentiation, which disrupt the 
development of production and exchange. Today, the 
European Union is facing a process of de-territorialization 
of activities focusing on the Western Union in both 
directions: one intra - European countries to the east 
cost of main - relatively low labour and the other towards 
the Asian region (especially India and China) because of 
the low labour costs and lack of social protection there. 
To some extent, we can say that employees of the 
country (countries with a high level of social protection) 
are injured; the profits are shared by labour abroad and 
the capital. This division is also unequal; the holders of 
capital and real money are recovering a large portion of 
profits in emerging countries, including China. D. Rodrik 
points out that the legitimacy of the globalization process 
requires a fair distribution of global earnings it 
generates. The idea that international trade could be 
developed based on the infinite differentiation of 
products is not in doubt since the transfer of technology 
and know-how is increasingly rapid progress of ICT and 
raising the qualifications of work. It could ultimately lead 
to a poor differentiation which means that the products 
are more substitutable competitors. Moreover, this type 
of trade can cause the appearance of external 
diseconomies (congestion of waterways with rising 
costs4, rising energy costs and thus costs of road 
transport and shipping, resulting in pollution, etc).  
Simultaneously, a new geography of economies of scale is 
being established. You can highlight it on two levels:  
•  at European level transiently;  
•  at Asian level  tendentiously.  
The increasing returns activities have developed in old 
Europe (area named "European blue banana"). The rest of 
the European Union is a productive second choice, lower 
economic development, where incomes and employment 
are lower skilled. The countries of Eastern recent 
members of the European Union, are an area of relocation 
of activities for companies in search of a qualified, less 
expensive hand than in the rest of the European Union 
                                                 
4 Avatars of freight traffic in the Channel show unambiguous. 
with socially and fiscally more beneficial production 
conditions. These choices can only be transient because 
the Eastern European countries will soon pose less 
competitive advantages than the countries of Asia, except 
adopting the social norms of Asian countries. Today’s 
Asian production and consumption markets represent the 
best expression of exploitation of economies of scale at a 
distance. Of course, the de-territorialization of activities 
towards the Asian region will increase the workforce of this 
area and the real owners of capital or currency (U.S., 
European, Japanese, etc.). A shift in the geography of 
industrial specialization is in progress. The mastery of the 
most developed products - systems and research remain 
temporarily located in countries that are currently leaders. 
The consequences could be significant in regard to the 
level of employment in these areas. Finally, recall the 
statistical finding current exchange intra - industry, 
anywhere in the world including the most developed 
countries of the European Union, is primarily an intra - 
industry vertical and not horizontal as it was implicitly 
considered for several decades because of its 
measurement from the Grubel-Lloyd standard (Grubel, 
Lloyd, 1975). So, we are confronted with a problem of 
economic adjustment costs because both the inter-
branches that intra - industry leading to vertical 
specialization, and thus to social shocks by loss of activity.  
In such a context of international competition, one might 
wonder whether a more proactive strategy of the 
European Union both in the direction of its relations with 
third countries in respect of its domestic production is not 
necessary today. What are the ways of adaptation 
options? 
2. What trade policies exist  
in the European Union? 
E. Laurent and J. Le Cacheux wrote in July 2005: "At least 
two contemporary developments must now be seriously 
considered: the first is the massive competition from Asia 
in manufacturing and industry, and the second is the 
comprehensive nature of this competition, which exercises 
(and exercised more tomorrow) as well as at the top to 
bottom of the ladder of comparative advantage. 
Unfortunately it is significant that Europe hangs in the 
trade negotiations at the idea of liberalization when the 
United States aggressively combine trade policy and 
exchange rate policy to maintain the momentum of their 
comparative advantages. The Union is able to change the 
theory when the facts change?”. Can a change in the 
common external trade policy by not calling into question 
the necessary openness to international trade, a factor of 
peace and generally gain welfare? How can the states 
intervene? What flexibilities do they have?  
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2.1. New ways for trade policies  
in the European Union 
Today, in general, any measure of import protection would 
contravene the rules set by WTO and is not relevant, only 
because it exposes the State protectionist retaliatory 
commercial measures. However, we can legitimately 
consider that the arguments against protectionism are not 
always unquestionably founded. We will use two examples 
to illustrate our point. The first is the case of the optimal 
rat e. W e kno w that the imposition of a tariff b y a large 
country leads to a lower world price and thus to support a 
portion of the tariff by the rest of the world. For the large 
country, an overall net surplus may occur. In this case, the 
tariff is optimal and creates a more advantageous position 
than before the introduction of customs duty. Then, take 
the example of agricultural levies which have disappeared 
following the GATT agreement, signed in Marrakesh in 
1994, and were replaced by tariff equivalents with a 
timetable for lowering the level which quickly eliminated 
preference. At first, referring to the traditional analysis of 
the effects of a customs duty in a situation of partial 
equilibrium and for a small country, the new regulation 
from the agricultural Marrakesh Agreement established a 
more advantageous situation for the European Union and 
the rest of the world. In fact, the gain is not European at 
all. Indeed, if on short term, the net surplus intra - 
European generated by this new situation is positive (net 
gain for European consumers), however on long term, the 
net result is more ambiguous. Indeed, agricultural 
products meet market mechanisms in spider webs (spider 
or cobweb model). As a result, fluctuations in prices and 
quantities can be large and in turn harm consumers and 
producers and / or third countries. It is precisely to limit 
such fluctuations are harmful to the community that the 
European mechanism to support agricultural prices has 
been designed around the market price between two 
institutional prices, a price ceiling and a floor price 
(specific mechanisms of regulation are triggering at these 
price limits to maintain the market price in the desired 
range). European consumers have been able to benefit 
from stable prices (although generally higher than world 
prices). The Marrakesh Agreement put an end to this 
mechanism of stabilization of agricultural prices in Europe 
by performing the removal of agricultural levies. The 
European agricultural markets are now largely open and 
internationalized and thus subject to international 
economic vagaries. European consumers have been 
injured in 2008 by rising international grain prices which 
has impacted particularly on the price of bread (a situation 
detrimental to the poorest). European markets, including 
those from agricultural commodities, are in direct contact 
with international markets without any tool similar 
community can now absorb the fluctuations in price and 
quantity characteristics of agricultural spider models. The 
European Union is no longer immune to a situation more 
chaotic than the year 2008 and it is not clear that the 
short term gain due to the abolition of agricultural tax 
offsets losses caused by variations in excess of producers 
and consumers resulting from spider mechanisms have 
not been stabilized (situation which now leads to the 
Marrakech Agreement). We therefore advocate for the 
regulation of agricultural m a r k e t s  b y  r a n g e s  o f  
administered prices with market prices released within 
these ranges because it is essential to stabilize 
agricultural spider cycles, the source of gains in the long 
run (the household being treated the same way as 
imported products).  
More generally and this time with reference to industrial 
production, it can be shown in the same way, if the 
abolition of tariff and non tariff have immediate positive 
net effects for the economy (net gain in consumer 
surplus). However, the loss of activity induced by a more 
efficient foreign competition can generate a range of costs 
that can reduce or eliminate gains initial lack of protection 
(increase of industrial desertification, especially in regions 
lagging behind, which could lead to loss of comparative 
advantages of other firms or sectors of activity).  
Several avenues are available to States to seek support 
for certain areas: the definition of strategic sectors and 
the establishment of investment funds dedicated. 
Consider the actions that have been conducted in France.  
Financial relations between France and other countries, in 
principle, are entirely in accordance with Article L 151-1 of 
the Monetary and Financial Code (MFC). This principle is 
confirmed by Article 56 of the Community Treaty. But this 
freedom is framed to allow the defence of national 
interests. In 2000, there was an awareness of the 
vulnerability of certain companies, especially following the 
participation of U.S. fund TPG Gemplus Company 
(manufacturer of smart cards) and the appointment of a 
director of a fund linked to the CIA to head the American 
company.  
In order to preserve national interests Decree No. 2005-
1739 of 30 December 2005 regulates the financial 
relations with foreign countries. It stipulates that foreign 
investors wishing to acquire control or a blocking minority 
of 33.33% must seek authorization from the French State. 
This text is not confined to taking control in the context of 
a takeover bid but to large and small companies, listed 
and unlisted companies, whatever the views of 
shareholders in place. Eleven sectors are defined as 
strategic by the government of Dominique de Villepin: 
•  gambling (on behalf of money laundering);  
•  private Security;  
•  research or development of means to cope with the 
illicit use in the course of terrorist activities 
pathogens (biotechnology: production of antidotes);  
•  equipment designed for interception of 
correspondence and conversations;  
•  the evaluation and certification of safety systems;  
•  the production of goods or services in the field of 
security systems;  
•  dual-use technologies (i.e. can be used for both 
civilian and military applications);  
•  cryptology (the science of secrecy whose purpose is 
to hide information from a message, it now has 
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applications in the areas of Internet banking 
systems, telephony, multimedia ...);  
•  the activities of the depository business national 
defence;  
•  research, production or trade of arms;  
•  activities carried out by companies which 
concluded a contract of study or supplying 
equipment to the Ministry of  Defence, directly or 
through subcontracting.  
On this basis the scope of the decree appears relatively 
large, the area of dual use technologies will be very large, 
most of the technologies may have uses in both civilian 
and military (communication…) environments. 
Furthermore, large groups of which a subsidiary operates 
in a sensitive area can be protected.  
The European Commission initiated in April 2006 an 
infringement procedure against the decree of France; it 
was considered incompatible with the free movement of 
capital within the zone (Article 56 of EU Treaty) and the 
principle of freedom of establishment (Article 43). The 
decree is "discriminatory and protectionist" in the words of 
European Commissioner Charlie McCreevy. The 
Commission sent on 12 October 2006 a "reasoned 
opinion" against the decree. But the position of the 
European authorities in fact testifies certain unease about 
this issue. They recognize the merits of the objectives of 
public security and defence of France, but consider the 
authorization associated with the decree disproportionate 
regarding its objectives. France responded in December 
2006 that the case of companies with low share of 
turnover is made in a strategic activity; the decree 
provides for review of the strategic sector and does not 
refer to the entire company. The French government may 
consider a change of control without blocking the calling 
investment commitments limited to institution. Since then, 
the procedure against France is "frozen". This position 
reflects the ultimate European concern to preserve 
against sensitive sectors such as equity participations 
massive sovereign wealth funds and the fact that Europe 
has no alternative to replace the States for this purpose.  
This control of investments in key sectors is fairly 
widespread internationally. In the United States, the CFIUS 
(the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
States) is responsible to approve acquisitions of U.S. firms 
by foreign companies including from Allied countries. In 
2008 Germany finalized its draft law on the control of 
sovereign investment funds. This project provides that the 
government could consider any equity participation of at 
least 25% of a SWF in a German company belonging to a 
"sensitive".  
The analysis of these experiments shows that it becomes 
essential to question the foundations of comparative 
advantage. Do they appear as a result of grants from state 
a i d  o r  p r o v e n  p r a c t i c e s  o f  d u m p i n g ?  I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  t h e  
European Union has at present the necessary tools to 
preserve the market for this type of unfair competition. But 
n o t e  t h a t  i n  g e n e r a l ,  w i t h  t r a d e ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h e  A s i a n  
region is not affected by this type of problem; in particular 
there are few cases of dumping. In the future, costs of 
production in this part of the world are expected to rise 
(rising wage rates and progressive development of social 
protection), but for now, they give it a competitive 
advantage, particularly for many industrial products. 
Cancel this advantage by imposing on the border of the 
developed countries to tax equalization social protectionist 
m e a s u r e s  w o u l d  b e  a  s o u r c e  o f  l o s s  o f  w e l l - b e i n g .  I t  
seems preferable to improve production in the most 
developed countries in maximizing the gains from 
economies of scale internal and external firms: 
competitive clusters can form such efficient production 
strategies, while they do not impede the development of 
international trade.  
2.2. The use of an efficient spatial organization  
of activities: the poles of competitiveness  
On a domestic level, the production community, failing to 
be regulated by common policies, can create new sources 
of comparative advantage by developing production 
strategies focused on the formation of industrial districts. 
Some European Union countries are attempting 
experiments of this type that are still essentially national 
(Spain, Denmark, etc) without direct involvement of 
community members. In France it is represented by the 
poles of competitiveness defined recently by the 
government. What are the advantages of such an 
organization of production?  
On a theoretical level, one of the first analysis on the 
geographical dimension of the industry is due to A. 
Marshall (Marshall, 1920) which develops the idea that a 
company benefits from three positive effects by locating 
near other made the same industry: cost savings of 
transport in the production and distribution, a local 
labour market effectively specialized and intensive 
exchange of information between producers. It localizes 
economies of scale. More recently, Mr. E. Porter (Porter, 
1998 and 2000) developed the theory that defines 
clusters of clusters as a geographical concentration of 
firms and institutions whose activities are interconnected 
and interdependent in a particular economic sector. The 
success of a cluster will be based on competitiveness 
resulting from the interconnection between businesses 
and institutions in a given space. The sector will 
nevertheless have one or more advantages, i.e. the 
strengths that make a dominant sector in a specific area. 
There are four critical factors in this competitive 
advantage: the factors of productions, including the 
specific factors, market demand, and related upstream 
industries, strategy and business structure. To explain 
the development of clusters, economic theory 
emphasizes the concept of economy of scale or 
increasing returns, i.e. the existence of gains to the 
concentration of production in a given space. The second 
element in any analysis of geographical economics is the 
emergence of transaction costs when officers are not at 
one location and they interact in their economic activities 
to exchange goods or services. These two conditions are 
necessary to explain the issue of geographic 
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concentration. Thus, the interaction of the forces of 
concentration -the exploitation of economies of scale 
localized- and transaction costs, can explain the 
existence of clusters.  
Today, the analysis of such clusters must take into account 
the evolution of imperfect competition induced by 
globalization activities that tend to bring more forms of 
monopolistic than oligopolistic competition. Indeed, the 
sharpness of competition between firms, due to the 
international mobility of factors and knowledge, is of such 
nature, that it leads to any continuous efforts and becomes 
increasingly important for product differentiation. 
Simultaneously, within the clusters, the most efficient firms 
will benefit from significant effects of spillovers from 
particular technological externalities and social interactions 
(information exchange in education and employment).  
This new productive context leads us to propose belowan 
analysis of situations of equilibrium in the cluster 
 monopoly. To the extent that production processes will 
face increasingly fierce global competition, the continued 
differentiation of the products will be the rule and enter 
the monopolistic market structure as dominant. Activities 
will yield in a growing stage of the growth of the cluster, 
that of the cluster efficiency (Figure 1) .  R M  i s  t h e  
average of the producer (or inverse demand function) 
and Rm, marginal revenue of producers. CM and Cm 
represent the average cost and marginal cost producers. 
By producing in the efficiency of the cluster, firms 
maximize their profit (in equilibrium Po, Qo). However, the 
cluster will be characterized by a curve of average cost of 
U5 long time due to inefficiencies in the initial phase of 
cluster growth (external diseconomies due to its small 
size) and at a later stage if it avoids the traditional costs 
of urban growth but also in the periphery. 
We may emphasize that the removal of a port area may 
hinder its integration into international trade, which 
                                                 




Figure 1. Situations of equilibrium in the cluster in the presence of economies and external 
diseconomies 
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seems therefore to condemn term competitiveness clus-
ters which, for example in the European Union, would 
be located outside the industrial community6 pentagon. 
The area efficiency of the cluster allows to create new 
competitive advantages, the fact that firms can operate 
in international markets will be the most frequent of in-
tense activity in research and development and innova-
tion and skilled labour.  
This strategy of building competitiveness cluster was 
developed in France since 2002. The government's 
goal is to create centres of excellence - for some major 
global companies - designed to enhance or bring out 
specializations within the French economy in the ser-
vice of its competitiveness.  
The policy of competitiveness clusters was decided in 
December 2002 (Interministerial Committee for 
Development and Competitiveness of the Territories). 
The CIACT of 14 September 2004 defines a method of 
implementation (call for projects on the basis of 
specifications). The government launched the first call 
for proposals on 2 December 2004, the procedure 
ends on 28 February 2005.  
The Government shall elect, in July 2005, 67 out of 
105 submissions. The location of projects 
demonstrates that a target of spatial planning to guide 
the selection of projects and to a lesser extent the 
allocation of financial resources is necessary. The 
desire of the government to focus on fewer projects 
was reversed. However, a budget priority is given to 
clusters with a global scope (they are then six) or 
having a vocation to acquire (nine).  
The third call for applications for project funding 
clusters was closed in December 2006. It resulted in 
224 project deposits. The results were announced in 
March 2007: 100 new projects from 47 centres to 
receive funding for single fund interministériel (FUI). In 
total, in 2006, 339 projects have been assessed (143 
were selected); they correspond to approximately one 
b i l l i o n  E u r o s  o f  i n v e s t m e n t  i n  r e s e a r c h  a n d  
development.  
In 2008, there are 71 competitive clusters of around 
9000 researchers working in nearly 1,000 projects 
labelled. One billion Euros were invested public since 
the launch of the poles in 2005 on a total of 1.5 billion 
Euros initially planned until 2008. One can observe that 
                                                 
6 This is the productive zone to increasing returns to scale of the 
European Union bounded by the cities of London, Paris, Milan, Munich 
and Hamburg. 
50% of funding focuses on six areas of global 
competitiveness (see list attached). Most competitive 
clusters are associations of type Act 1901, i.e. the non-
profit organizations. They can also take the form of 
economic interest groups (GIE) or scientific interest 
groups (SIGs). The poles have a legal personality. The 
main principles on which the poles are based are:  
•  a funding mechanism for collaborative R & D 
according to the principles of FUI current size 
and with sufficient financial stability to attract 
and within clusters, a critical mass of 
participants of any kind;  
•  public support to local entertainment centres, 
bringing together large groups, SMEs, research 
and training;  
•  coordinated action by local authorities and state 
policy in the poles.  
The incentives associated with the projects labelled are 
substantial:  
•  tax exemptions and reductions in charges. A 
company participating in a research and 
development in an area recognized is exempt 
from corporate income tax during the first three 
years. Areas "zoned R & D" correspond in outline 
to the perimeter of the poles of competitiveness.  
•  credits from intervention including the Ministry in 
charge of industry and DIACT;  
•  preferential interventions from various agencies 
(National Research Agency established in 2005, 
the Agency for Industrial Innovation, which 
merged in January 2008 with OSEO and the 
Caisse des Depots et Consignations).  
At local level, local authorities are involved in financing.  
The Boston Consulting Group and CM led International 
between November 2007 and June 2008, an 
assessment of competitiveness clusters and the 
accompanying policy established by the State. For 
these experts, the results seem very positive. The 
amounts pledged were actually used for the benefit of 
innovation. The clusters show a strong promise, "the 
Poles were allowed to employ agents whose activities 
were previously isolated. The level of involvement of 
SMEs is high: they receive a large share of funding 
devoted to projects. The high number of poles did not 
result in massive dilution of financial resources through 
a concentration of resources on the global clusters.  
According to the report, 39 centres have achieved the 
objectives of cluster policy, 19 have reached the part 
and should work on improving certain aspects of their 
12 TRADE POLICIES FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION TODAY 
 
w o r k  ( t h e i r  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  s t r a t e g y ,  g o v e r n a n c e  
arrangements, role of the team animation. 13 poles 
could benefit from a reconfiguration in depth. On this 
basis, the report recommends maintaining the main 
principles of poles and proposes five possible 
developments:  
•  consolidate -and on the long term the positive 
dynamics of cooperation on innovation launched 
in 2005 through the poles of competitiveness;  
•  more highly-responsible actors of the poles of 
competitiveness by moving towards a logic of 
contracts and verification, in a simplified local 
environment;  
•  reaffirm the commitment of the State to the 
poles and develop the strategic dimension;  
•  maintain project funding, collaborative 
innovation and further optimization of circuits 
funding by enhancing their overall coherence;  
•  better integration of the cluster policy in research 
policies and support for R & D.  
A report from CEPREMAP also published in 2008 is 
more reserved on the functioning of French poles. They 
would be inefficient compared to their high cost. The 
report recommends that rather to reduce the obstacles 
to the creation of centres of optimal size. In this context 
particular attention should be paid to the functioning of 
the real estate market (lower transaction costs, 
increased supply of land at the local level ...) and to 
improve the quality of goods. Furthermore, according to 
the reporters, an artificial and forced specialization in 
certain areas of vulnerability for the economy? Sector 
to shocks that globalization makes it more likely. 
Nevertheless, the influence of these poles on the 
specializations of the national economy can be seen on 
long term: the benefits and costs can only be assessed 
on a distant horizon. The poles are now the most 
promising policy for the emergence of specialization in 
an environment increasingly open, where technologies 
are spreading faster and faster. 
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